This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher (semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market in ‡uencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect in ‡uencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization.
Introduction
It is generally assumed that bank managers are disciplined by internal governance mechanisms and by their supervisors. Whether or not banks are also disciplined by …nancial markets is less clear. Yet, the Basel capital adequacy rules, one of the cornerstones of modern bank regulation, mention market discipline as a separate third pillar (next to capital ratios and supervisory interventions). Relatedly, stress testing exercises have expanded the disclosure requirements of banks, with the explicit objective to foster market discipline.
In this paper we revisit this issue by focusing on the stock market as a potential source of market discipline on banks. The crucial question is: Can the stock market assess bank risk and in ‡uence bank behavior? Bliss and Flannery (2002) distinguish two components of market discipline: market monitoring and market in ‡uencing. They de…ne market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess the condition of the …rm, and in ‡uencing as subsequent managerial actions in response to these assessments.
While there is considerable evidence of market monitoring (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Morgan and Stiroh (2001) ), research examining the market in ‡uencing channel is more scarce and generally inconclusive. Bliss and Flannery (2002) fail to …nd evidence that bank stockholders or bondholders e¤ectively in ‡uence bank indicators controlled by bank managers, such as the leverage position of the BHC, factors a¤ecting bank asset risk, changes in the number of employees and the amount of uninsured liabilities. Gendreau and Humphrey (1980) …nd that banks are penalized for higher leverage by a higher cost of debt and equity, but …nd no evidence that these relative cost changes induce bank managers to alter their leverage position relative to other banks. Ashcraft (2008) shows that the proportion of subordinated debt in total regulatory capital a¤ects the probability of failure and future distress, suggesting that bank debtholders are able to signi…cantly in ‡uence the behavior of distressed banks. Schaeck, Cihak, Maechler, and Stolz (2012) …nd evidence for debtholder discipline in a sample of small and medium-sized commercial banks in the US over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] : Bank managers are more likely to be removed if the bank is …nancially weak and this e¤ect is stronger for banks subject to discipline exerted by large debtholders. The authors …nd no conclusive evidence of discipline exerted by shareholders or depositors, nor that forced turnovers consistently improve bank performance (even at windows of three years after the turnover). Hence, current empirical research predominantly supports the view that market discipline is, at best, a relatively weak disciplining device.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a new test for direct market in ‡uencing. Our procedure starts by identifying stock market-based risk and (negative) valuation signals at the individual 1 bank level. Consequently, we test to what extent bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a (combination of a) risk and negative valuation signal. Using a partial adjustment model, we test both for a change in the long-term target value of the strategic variable, as well as in the speed of adjustment towards that long-term target value. This partial adjustment model has been used quite often to model various …rm characteristics, for example by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) for leverage, Lintner (1956) for dividend payout ratios and Fama and French (2000) , Raymar (1991) and Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) for earnings.
An important innovation is the way we de…ne the risk and valuation signals. We model our risk measure, equity return semi-volatility (SV, henceforth), measured over one quarter of daily data, along a stochastic frontier. The stochastic frontier describes the level of risk that the best performing banks with similar characteristics can attain. We call a bank ine¢ cient from a risk perspective when it is situated above the risk frontier, i.e. when it has more risk than its best performing peers. A bank will receive a risk signal at time t if its ine¢ ciency score at that time is situated among the 10 percent worst ine¢ ciency scores of all banks over the preceding four years and is hence substantially above the risk frontier. We use a similar approach for our valuation measure, the market-to-book (MTB) ratio, only here we allow banks to be either under-or overvalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We say that a bank receives a negative valuation signal when its quarterly valuation score belongs to the 10 percent largest undervaluations (of all banks, over the preceding four years). Looking at large signals relative to the best performing peer is crucial. As market prices are forward looking, they re ‡ect information on …rms'fundamentals, but also on expected corrective actions. If investors expect a corrective action, the resulting signal will be smaller (Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) ). Using the most extreme signals makes it less likely that we look at events where investors have strong expectations on corrective behavior. Nevertheless, the results are robust (but unreported) when using the 25 percent worst ine¢ ciency or valuation scores as signals.
The main result of this paper is that we …nd substantial evidence in favor of the direct market in ‡uencing hypothesis. We show that banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing their long-term target capital bu¤er and by decreasing their liquidity risk. Banks that receive a negative valuation signal react by increasing their target pro…t level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio. This suggests that managers trying to improve the market assessment of their bank's value attempt this mainly by improving cost e¢ ciency.
Apart from adjusting their long-term target ratios, we also …nd banks to more quickly bridge the gap between the current and target rate following a market signal. These adjustments are in line with expectations and with the objectives of supervisors.
Furthermore, we investigate whether or not our …ndings can be interpreted as evidence of direct in ‡u-encing rather than indirect in ‡uencing. Indirect market discipline means that the change in bank behavior is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than the stakeholder (shareholders in our case) exerting the monitoring e¤ort. First, we argue that the number of Prompt Corrective Actions (PCAs) is so small that our signals are unlikely to be proxies for regulatory interventions. Second, our results do not appear to be driven by in ‡uencing from subordinated debtholders, as we …nd that our in ‡uencing results are most pronounced for those banks that do not have subordinated debt. Third, we test whether or not our results are potentially driven by in ‡uencing exercised by retail or wholesale deposit holders. We do observe that the share of retail funding in total funding is larger for banks receiving a risk signal. This is mainly due to increasing the core deposits, and we do not …nd evidence that it is more likely for a bank to lose wholesale funding following a risk signal. Nevertheless, as in most other studies addressing this issue, there is still a need for caution since other sources of discipline, such as unobserved actions taken by the supervisory authorities, may a¤ect bank behavior. Finally, we investigate in more detail which characteristics make it more likely that a bank will receive a risk or valuation signal. We consider the variance of the signal to be the scope for pressure from stock market investors. Therefore, in an extension of our setup, we allow the variance of the residuals to vary through time and change with bank characteristics. We …nd that stock market investors punish discretionary accounting behavior and that the degree of bank opacity has a positive e¤ect on the variance of the residuals (and hence the likelihood of observing market signals).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a new setup to assess the di¤erent components of market discipline, i.e. market monitoring and in ‡uencing, in a uni…ed framework.
The …rst part discusses the stochastic frontier model for Semi-Volatility and the linear regression model for the Market-to-Book ratio. Next, we show how to extract risk and valuation signals from both models. The …nal section presents the partial adjustment model that we use to empirically test for market in ‡uencing. Bliss and Flannery (2002) de…ne market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess the condition of the …rm. Previous papers have tested the market monitoring hypothesis by relating bank risk and valuation to bank-speci…c characteristics in a linear regression framework (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990 ), Stiroh (2004 ), Stiroh (2006b , Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) , Calomiris and Nissim (2007) ):
Equation (1) relates bank-speci…c stock market-based risk and valuation measures Y i;t to various lagged 1 bank-speci…c characteristics X i;t . We relate the dependent variable to four sets of bank characteristics, proxying for respectively: (i) the bank's funding structure, (ii) asset mix, (iii) revenue diversity and (iv) overall bank strategy. Our vector X i;t of bank-speci…c characteristics, which appears in Equation (1), is hence given by: 
Following Calomiris and Nissim (2007), we use the market-to-book value of equity as a measure of the long-run value of the bank. The market-to-book value of equity (M T B) is measured as the end of quarter market value divided by tangible common equity. As a measure of risk, we use the quarterly semi-volatility (SV ) 2 measured over a quarterly moving window of excess stock returns for bank i (excess over the risk-free return): Instead of using a linear regression for risk, we model semi-volatility along a stochastic frontier.
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This allows us distinguishing between banks that are on the frontier (given the characteristics associated with their business model) and risk ine¢ cient banks. The best performing bank, relative to its peers with 1 We use one-quarter lagged values rather than contemporaneous values to account for the lag with which accounting information is disclosed. A detailed appendix discusses the construction of these indicators with a reference to the FRY9C codes of the constitutent items. 2 Semi-volatility or semi-deviation potentially captures downside risk better than total volatility. The latter is calculated using both upside and downside changes in returns, whereas the former uses only downside returns (below the average). However, the correlation between the two measures is high. The results presented in the paper also hold when using total volatility. Results are available upon request.
3 Stochastic frontier analysis is also a parametric approach. A non-parametric equivalent is data envelopment analysis as used for instance by Lee and Chih (2013) . similar characteristics, has minimal risk, and will be situated close or on the frontier. 4 We call banks risk ine¢ cient if they are situated (much) above the frontier, i.e. have much more risk compared to their best performing peers.
Summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables are reported in Table 1 . Our sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive quarters in the period 1991-2007. 5 The total sample consists of 17; 264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. We exclude illiquid stocks as well as control for important mergers and acquisitions 6 .
< Insert Table 1 around here > Finding signi…cant relationships between these bank characteristics and the risk and valuation measure would be evidence of the …rst step in market discipline, market monitoring. If so, we can conclude that equityholders track the di¤erent risks associated with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics.
Many studies already addressed the issue of bank monitoring, i.e. the …rst step in a test for market discipline, by relating bank risk and/or return to bank-speci…c characteristics (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990 ), Stiroh (2004 ), Stiroh (2006b , Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) or (Calomiris and Nissim (2007) ). Our focus and contribution lies in testing for market in ‡uencing. Nevertheless, to allow comparison with existing studies and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of the analysis, we brie ‡y describe the results of the baseline equation of monitoring in an appendix. While not the main contribution of this paper, we believe we still add to this literature by considering a more comprehensive range of bank characteristics. 4 More speci…cally, contrary to the linear model, we assume that the part of SV i;t not explained by bank characteristics can be further decomposed in a pure noise component, i;t iid N (0; 2 v ) and in one-sided departures (risk ine¢ ciencies), u i;t ;
from the stochastic frontier. The stochastic frontier is determined by the equation^ 0 +^ X i;t 1 . 5 All data are collected from the publicly available FR Y-9C reports. Consequently, we link the FR Y-9C reports to banks' stock prices (obtained from CRSP) using the match provided on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York website http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html 6 As a liquidity threshold, we impose that the bank stock's traded volume should be non-zero in at least 80 percent of trading days during the quarter. We control for mergers and acquisitions and create a new bank identity whenever a bank's total assets increase more than 10% on a quarterly basis and there is a change in activity mix. The change in activity mix is identi…ed as follows. We measure activities along three dimensions (funding structure, loan portfolio composition and revenue mix).
For each of these dimensions, we create a measure of focus/diversi…cation. If there is a large change in focus in one of these measures, i.e. a change larger than one standard deviation, within three years after a large jump in total assets (10% growth on a quarterly basis), we label this as a change in activity composition following the expansion.
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Extracting Stock Market Signals
Market in ‡uencing refers to managerial actions in response to the risk and valuation assessments made in the market monitoring stage (Bliss and Flannery (2002) ). Hence, for the purpose of our study, the crucial output from this …rst stage regression described in the previous section are risk and valuation signals. We say a bank receives an undervaluation signal when its residual (calculated using equation (1) Each quarter, we sort BHCs into deciles according to the level of the market signal 8 . The most extreme decile (highest risk or lowest value) is represented by the thick line. We also report the least extreme decile as well as the two middle deciles (combined in one line). The portfolio formation quarter is denoted as time period 1. We then compute the average ine¢ ciency score for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 quarters, 7 We thus estimate the monitoring (or 'rules') equation using the full sample period, but determine the signals in a backward looking way. Hence, we assume that the bank knows the benchmark equation used by investors to benchmark value or risk, but that future realizations are unknown when determining current signals. Rather than using the entire history of data (which would imply more information for later periods), we employ a backward looking rolling window. The latter approach is motivated by the 'institutional memory hypothesis' that implies that only a recent horizon matters and not the full history (see e.g. Berger and Udell (2004) ). We set the length of the moving window at 4 years (we did experiment with windows of 5 and 6 years and get similar results). 8 The …gure is inspired by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) , who investigate the persistence of …rm capital ratios. This methodology is ideally suited for investigating the cross-sectional dispersion and time evolution of bank characteristics over longer periods.
6 holding the portfolio composition constant (except for BHCs that exit the sample). We repeat these two steps of sorting and averaging for every quarter in the sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . This process generates 60 sets of event-time averages, one for each quarter in our sample. We then compute the average risk ine¢ ciency score and undervaluation residual of each portfolio across the 60 sets within each event quarter.
The dashed lines surrounding the portfolio averages represent 90% con…dence intervals. They are computed as the average standard error across the 60 sets of averages (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) ).
< Insert Figure 
In ‡uencing by Equityholders
The in ‡uencing channel of market discipline implies that bankers should take o¤-setting actions to align their performance with the interest of monitors, which are stock market investors in the context of this paper.
We investigate the market in ‡uencing hypothesis by testing whether or not bank managers make strategic reallocations following a negative risk and/or valuation signal. We are particularly interested in the e¤ect of market signals on the capital ratio and the pro…tability of the bank (here measured as ROE), since an increase in bank capital reduces risk and higher pro…ts boost bank value. However, strategic reallocations may take di¤erent forms. Therefore, we focus on an set of seven strategic bank characteristic which are next to the capital ratio and pro…tability (ROE), also asset quality (non-performing loans ratio), cost ine¢ ciency (cost-to-income ratio), liquidity (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest income to total income and the dividend pay-out ratio. The …ve additional strategic bank variables can be interpreted as the underlying drivers of pro…ts and capital levels. We believe that these ratios re ‡ect the main strategic decision variables directly under the control of bank management.
To account for a gradual and potentially incomplete adjustment in the di¤erent strategic variables, we estimate a partial adjustment model. 10 The general speci…cation for a partial adjustment model is:
where y represents a strategic bank characteristic, y is the target level of y and the speed of convergence to this target level. To formally test for market in ‡uencing, we investigate whether or not (i) the implied target level is di¤erent for banks that receive a market signal and (ii) banks receiving a market signal converge faster to the target. Therefore, Equation (3) is modi…ed such that the adjustment speed and target level can vary by bank and over time: (4), for each of the seven strategic bank variables: 
Pooling all terms that contain y i;t (and bringing this combination in front) yields:
Hence, the term before the square brackets corresponds with the …rst term in Equation (4), whereas the …rst term in square brackets corresponds with the expression of the conditional target, y in Equation (4). Rather than reporting the estimated coe¢ cients of the reduced-form partial adjustment model 12 , which we estimate for each of the seven strategic bank variables under consideration, we summarize the relevant information in two statistics that we think are easy to interpret: the long-run target level and adjustment speed. Calculating the target levels and speed of adjustment for the eight indicators using the coe¢ cients of Equation (6) results in eight 2 by 2 matrices in Table 2 :
The left 13 hand side table contains information on the target level of the bank characteristic. The upper 1 1 A concern is that the worst performers, which are more likely to fail or be acquired, would bias the results. Therefore, we discard all observations up to eight quarters before the last quarter the BHC appears in the sample. Hence, this implies that the last potential signal for each BHC occurs 16 quarters before the BHC disappears from the sample (as we look at a change in strategic bank variables over a period of eight quarters following a risk or valuation signal). 1 2 Results are available upon request. 1 3 We evaluate the expression of the targets at the sample mean of the variables in the X-vector. As we standardize all variables in the X-vector , this simply implies that they drop from the equation. Furthermore, in the paper we report results when the dummy variable D Table 2 contains the main results of this paper and are generally supportive for the hypothesis of stock market in ‡uencing in US banking. Starting with the capital ratio and bank pro…tability (here measured as ROE), we expect to …nd that bank capital increases after a risk signal and that a negative valuation signal induces bank management to improve pro…tability. The target capital ratio in the no-signal case is 11:5%, which is in line with the summary statistics reported in Table 1 . Banks that receive a risk signal (SV ine¢ ciency in the highest decile) have a signi…cantly higher target capital ratio (12:2%). This indicates that bank management reacts to a perceived increase in the riskiness of their bank by increasing the capital bu¤er, as expected. Banks that receive a valuation signal from the stock market react by adjusting the target capital ratio downwards (to 10:4%) and at a much faster speed. This is in line with the results of Table A .1 (in appendix) which indicate that higher capitalized banks have lower risk and lower market-tobook ratios. These …ndings support the hypothesis that banks adjust their capital adequacy target as a reaction to pressure from the stock market. On the pro…t side, we observe that the target ROE ratio slightly decreases from 3:4% to 3:2% when the bank receives a risk signal from the stock market. However, in case the bank gets a valuation signal, bank management reacts by signi…cantly increasing the target pro…t level (to 4:1%). Note that ROE is expressed at the quarterly frequency. On an annual basis, this implies an increase in target ROE from 13:6% to 16:4%. Hence, bank management responds to market pressure by signaling a strategic refocusing aimed at increasing ROE, although the speed of adjustment does not change signi…cantly, presumably indicating that increased pro…ts take time to materialize. 1 4 We cluster the standard errors at the bank level in the estimation of Equation (4).
A New Test of Market In ‡uencing: Empirical Results
10
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The other strategic bank variables can be interpreted as the underlying drivers of pro…ts and capital levels. The following picture emerges. When banks are confronted with a risk signal, they not only adjust their target capital level upwards, but also reduce their liquidity risk by increasing the target liquid assets ratio from 2:6% to 4:8%. The target level for the reliance on non-interest income is lowered substantially, although slightly insigni…cant at the 10% level, but the speed of adjustment towards the target increases from 15% to 28%. Banks in the highest risk ine¢ ciency decile tend to increase their target proportion of non-performing loans, which may be surprising at …rst. However, credit risk in the loan portfolio is only one dimension of total bank risk, which we measure as semi-volatility. The increased non-performing loans ratio may be the outcome of increased transparency (i.e. management having to report more accurately), rather than an actual change in credit risk.
We showed before that in case of a valuation signal, banks respond by increasing their target ROE level. Table 2 shows that at the same time, bank managers substantially and signi…cantly reduce the target costto-income ratio (from 61:4% in the base case to 55:0%). This indicates that bank managers try to improve pro…ts primarily by focusing on the cost e¢ ciency of their organization. Since management has a large degree of discretion in altering the bank's cost structure 15 , this may be interpreted as a credible signal by the stock market. When both signals occur simultaneously, the most pronounced impact, both economically and statistically, can be observed for the implied target levels of the retail funding ratio (from 65:5% to 81:5%).
The …ndings for the speed of adjustment towards the implied target levels exhibit a similar pattern, although the degree of signi…cance is usually lower. Nevertheless, whenever the adjustment speed is statistically di¤erent from the benchmark no-signal case, the evidence points in the direction of a faster adjustment towards the target. Hence, banks respond by either changing a strategic bank characteristics or by reacting more swiftly to deviations from the optimal level. Based on these results, we conclude that bank management does react to stock market-based risk and valuation signals. Market signals in ‡uence banks to adjust the target levels of capital, pro…ts and the main drivers of these two strategic indicators in the requested direction. Our results help in explaining a pattern documented by Calomiris and Nissim (2007) . They show that BHCs that have lower than predicted market-to-book ratios (compared to an estimated model) tend to experience large, statistically signi…cant, predictable increases in market values in subsequent quarters.
They also investigate whether the predictable changes in stock prices re ‡ect priced risk factors and …nd that they do not. Our results lend support for the view that future increases in market value in response to a large undervaluation signal are caused by corrective actions taken by managers.
Moreover, the identi…ed support for the in ‡uencing hypothesis is a lower bound of the overall corrective behavior. The key identi…cation problem here is that stock returns re ‡ect news about (expected) fundamentals. Expected changes in fundamentals will lead to a spurious relationship between current signals and future values of bank strategic variables in the opposite direction of the in ‡uencing hypothesis. For example, a current valuation signal may be an indication that investors worry about future cash ‡ows and pro…tability, whereas in ‡uencing implies that managers take actions to improve pro…tability after a negative valuation signal. In general, we …nd evidence for corrective behavior as risk signals lead to more prudent behavior and undervaluation leads to improved performance. If it would be a re ‡ection of fundamentals, it would go in the other direction (as for example the increase in non-performing loans following a risk signal). As the two e¤ects are di¢ cult to disentangle empirically, we prefer emphasizing the …nding of in ‡uencing, rather than focusing on the magnitude of the impact of in ‡uencing.
4 Direct or Indirect In ‡uencing?
Some caution is necessary in the interpretation of our evidence of market discipline. As mentioned in Flannery (2001) and Federal Reserve System (1999), market in ‡uencing has two components. Direct market in ‡uence means that a certain stakeholder can assess the riskiness of bank holding companies (market monitoring) and induce bank managers to change their risk behavior (market in ‡uencing) in their interest. Indirect market discipline means that the change in bank behavior is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than the stakeholder exerting the monitoring e¤ort (see also Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008)). In our case, indirect market discipline would then only be partly based on stock market information. For example, managerial decisions could be taken in response to supervisory intervention, which could itself be triggered by stock market signals. Disentangling direct from indirect in ‡uence is probably the most daunting task in the market discipline literature and probably requires a setup of a (controlled or natural) experiment or full access to all actions (formal/informal) taken by the supervisor. In the absence thereof, we cannot completely rule out that our …ndings of market discipline are evidence of indirect in ‡uencing. Nevertheless, we believe that we can exclude several potential channels of indirect in ‡uence.
Regulatory Interventions
We are not able to compare the timeliness and accuracy of regulatory bank assessments against market evaluations, as in Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) or Evano¤ and Wall (2002 
Subordinated Debtholders
The majority of studies on market discipline look at subordinated debt 20 to infer evidence of monitoring and in ‡uencing. The reason is that subordinated debtholders have a concave claim on the value of the bank.
Thus, the price of subordinated debt will be informative about the probability of left-tail outcomes, and subordinated debtholders 21 will have strong incentives to monitor and curb bank risk-taking. Using subordinated debt prices, most studies tend to …nd no response in bank behavior when the price of subordinated debt changes (Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)). This could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it may indicate a failure to …nd evidence of market in ‡uencing, possibly because the choice of issuing subordinated debt is endogenous. Most likely, only safer banks, or banks with a conjectured support of a safety net, will issue subordinated debt. On the other hand, the mere presence of subordinated debt may be su¢ cient to discipline banks and make future signals (i.e. changes in price rather than the …rst issuance of (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . These 38 PCAs take place in 20 distinct …nancial institutions. 14 of these institutions are not a member of a bank holding company. Only three banks are member of a one-bank holding company. With respect to the …nancial insitutions under supervision by the Federal Reserve, we …nd 27 PCAs in the period 1991-2007. However, only 6 of them (in 5 distinct institutions) took place during our sample period. 1 8 In our sample, we observe 91 bank-quarter observatios in which a BHC is categorized as undercapitalized. 41 of these breaches occur in 1991 and 1992. As of 1993, we observe on average less than one bank per quarter that is forced to take a prompt corrective action. 1 9 In addition, the (…nancial) market structure and supervision structure are jointly determined (Masciandaro and Quintyn (2008)). 2 0 For example, Ashcraft (2008) , Sorescu (1996), Goyal (2005) , Sironi (2003), Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011 ), Evano¤ and Wall (2002 ), and Blum (2002 . 2 1 Subordinated debt, which is typically used in studies of market discipline, is junior to insured debt and senior to equity.
Subordinated debtholders give credit to shareholders for the portion of risk shifted past them to the senior claimant (insured depositors and hence the guarantor). Levonian (2001) documents that subordinated debt therefore has features of both sources of funding. Hence, he claims that (changes in) subordinated debt prices reveal two pieces of information about the bank: Info on market value of assets and asset volatility. Exactly the same information can be obtained from bank stock prices and for a larger sample of banks.
14 subordinated debt) uninformative.
< Insert Table 3 around here > Therefore, we examine the presence of in ‡uencing in the subsets of BHCs with and without outstanding subordinated debt. Summary statistics on the bank characteristics in both subsamples are reported in Table   3 . Banks in both samples di¤er signi…cantly from each other in almost all dimensions. The results of the in ‡uencing tests for both subpopulations are reported in Table 4 .
< Insert Table 4 around here >
The general …nding is that we obtain somewhat stronger evidence of market discipline in the subsample of BHCs without subordinated debt. We …nd weaker support for market in ‡uencing in the subgroup of banks issuing subordinated debt. For the latter, the target capital is not signi…cantly di¤erent for banks which receive a risk or valuation signal. In the subgroup of banks that have subordinated debt, the target ROE increases from 14% to 16% after a valuation signal, whereas banks without subordinated debt increase this target from 13:2% to more than 17%. A higher target liquidity ratio is observed for banks receiving both signals simultaneously. The in ‡uencing results for the subgroup of banks without subordinated debt are indicative for direct in ‡uencing, since there can be no contemporaneous action or signal by debtholders.
Note also that this sample, which is by de…nition omitted from most of the previous literature, is also much larger than the set of BHCs with outstanding subordinated debt (see …rst line of Table 3 ).
Retail and Wholesale Depositors
While we can to a signi…cant extent exclude that our stock market based signals coincide with supervisory interventions or pressure from the subordinated debtholders, it may still be that the response following the risk signal is indirect if the pressure would be coming from insured retail (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011)). We observe that the share of retail funding in total funding is larger for banks receiving a joint valuation and risk signal (especially for banks without subordinated debt). Hence retail depositors run to the bank, rather than disciplining banks. This …nding is in line with Acharya and Mora (2012)'s liquidity backstop argument. The banking system seems to act as a stabilizing liquidity insurer, and actively seeks for deposits via managing deposit rates. Furthermore, we do not …nd evidence that a BHC is more likely to observe a decrease in the amount of wholesale deposits in response to a risk signal. In particular, we estimate a probit model 22 that relates the probability of observing a reduction in wholesale deposits over a horizon of eight quarters to obtaining a market signals at the beginning of that eight quarter period. We do not …nd that a risk and/or valuation signal signi…cantly increases the probability of a deposit out ‡ow. We interpret the latter as the absence of a run by uninsured wholesale …nanciers (in contrast to what happened to some banks in the recent crisis).
Risk versus Market-to-Book
We explore two dimensions of bank performance: risk and value. While bank risk is of interest to many stakeholders (especially debtholders, regulators and depositors), stock market investors also care about the long-term value of the bank. In particular, they care about the value of the bank relative to a peer group of banks (that is why we use MTB signals conditional on a large set of bank characteristics). As no other stakeholder is harmed by a low valuation, especially if there is no contemporaneous risk signal, a response to a MTB signal (upper right cell of the two-by-two matrices in Table 2 ) can be interpreted as in ‡uencing in favor of the stakeholder who is giving the signal (hence direct in ‡uencing). The results in Table 2 convincingly show that there are signi…cant relationships between an undervaluation signal (MTB is substantially lower than its peers; i.e. residual is situated in the lowest decile) and future changes in strategic bank variables. This can be interpreted as evidence of direct in ‡uencing in response to a valuation signal by bank equityholders.
As an extension, we also examine what happens when the bank managers get a positive valuation signal.
For example, they may also become lax after positive signals and try to maximize their own bene…ts. To that end, we alter the setup of in ‡uencing and allow for a risk signal, a negative valuation signal and a positive valuation signal (results are available upon request). We …nd mixed evidence of slack or lax behavior after receiving positive signals. Getting a positive valuation signal does not a¤ect the target levels, but does lead to more sluggish adjustments of the capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, the main di¤erence between the negative and positive valuation signals is that the former lead to faster adjustment to a new target, whereas the latter only leads to slower adjustment to the same target.
Stock prices versus subordinated debt yields
Apart from a new testing strategy, this paper di¤ers from many other studies on market discipline because it infers evidence on market monitoring and in ‡uencing from stock prices (as in Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck 2 2 The additional results referred to in this subsection are available upon request.
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(2008)), rather than from subordinated debt (e.g., Ashcraft (2008), Flannery and Sorescu (1996) (2007) show that there is a distinct convex nonlinear relationship between the market-to-book ratio and bank risk. Based on their empirical tests, they conclude that for publicly held US BHCs, the interests of bank stockholders are aligned with those of regulators and debtholders (except for a small subset of extremely risky ones). Stockholders penalize riskier strategies to preserve charter value. Only when the option value becomes large enough to compensate for the loss of charter value, stockholders elect instead to reward risk-taking to further increase the put option value, but this only happens for a very small portion of their sample. Third, in comparison with subordinated debt, stock prices are available for a larger sample of banks (see …rst line of Table 3 ). In addition, according to Kwan (2002) , stock market data have an advantage over bond market data in terms of higher quality. Stock market data are more likely to timely incorporate information than bond prices, because stocks are traded more frequently, are easier to short, and because they are followed by more professional analysts than bonds. Hence, we extend the test of market disciplining to the sample of BHCs that do not have outstanding subordinated debt. This allows us to examine whether the lack of empirical support for market discipline is due to the sample under consideration, the risk signal (subordinated debt prices versus stock prices) or both.
Tying this evidence together, we conclude that banks respond to risk and value signals by equityholders.
Moreover, it is unlikely that other stakeholders give contemporaneous signals, which reinforces the case in favor of direct in ‡uencing. Moreover, we …nd that banks shift to less risky activities in response to a volatility signal, even though equityholders have a convex payo¤ function and may like risk. Moreover, this claim is even more convincing in the case where there is both a risk and valuation signal. In these situations, equityholders strongly indicate that the bank is taking risks for which they are not compensated and banks react accordingly.
5 Which banks are more likely to get signals?
We now investigate in more detail which characteristics make it more likely that a bank will receive a risk or valuation signal. Recall that these signals are based on the extreme ine¢ ciency scores (risk signal) or residuals (valuation signal). All else equal, banks for which the variance of the ine¢ ciency scores or residuals is larger, will have a higher chance of receiving a risk or valuation signal. Therefore, we investigate which bank characteristics drive the variance of the risk ine¢ ciencies or market-to-book residuals. For the semivolatility setup, we add scale heterogeneity to the stochastic frontier model. For the market-to-book ratio, we use a regression model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity as in Harvey (1976) . 23 We make the variance a function of time-varying bank-speci…c characteristics Z i;t , such that 2 ui;t = exp ( 0 + Z i;t ). We use the exponential function to guarantee that the variance is positive. A positive and signi…cant implies that bank characteristics Z i;t increases the variance. A larger variance makes a larger risk ine¢ ciency score or MTB residual, which may lead to in ‡uencing, more likely. Therefore, we consider this dispersion or variance to be the scope for pressure or signals coming from stock market investors conditional on their assessment of banks' risk and value pro…les. We hypothesize and test whether or not this pressure by stock market investors is related to (1) complexity, (2) managerial discretion, and (3) opaqueness. We motivate each of these variables individually and discuss the estimation results in parallel.
Complexity: Funding, asset and revenue composition
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In complex, diversi…ed …rms such as large BHCs, determining the …nancial condition of a conglomerate might be harder compared to assessing the …nancial strength of a specialized …rm. Diversi…cation of activities might, however, also yield more risk-e¢ cient banks if the shocks to the di¤erent types of activities are imperfectly correlated (Laeven and Levine (2007)). Hence, one view is that equityholders use less discretion as they expect shocks to di¤erent activities to cancel out. The other is that more diversi…ed banks may be harder to monitor as they leave more scope for managerial discretion. We include Hirschman Her…ndahl indices (HHI) of specialization in each of the core activities of banks: a HHI for diversi…cation in funding (deposit diversi…cation), a HHI for loan diversi…cation, a HHI for revenue diversity in general (the mix between interest and non-interest income) and a HHI capturing diversity of four non-interest income components. A < Insert Table 5 around here >
The estimation results can be found in Table 5 . The variance of total risk ine¢ ciency is positively related to specialization. This indicates that, from a monitoring perspective, the portfolio e¤ects of diversi…cation more than compensate the cost of increased complexity that diversi…cation may entail. Note that this e¤ect is not only statistically, but also economically signi…cant. A one standard deviation increase in income specialization increases the dispersion of total risk with 16:2%.
A higher loan growth rate leads to a larger variance in the valuation of BHCs. Hence, an expansionary strategy makes it more di¢ cult to assess the true value. More stable earnings, re ‡ected by a lower ROE volatility, lead to a lower dispersion in total risk ine¢ ciency scores as well as in the residual variance of the market-to-book ratio. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in ROE volatility leads to an increase in the variance of (risk) ine¢ ciency of 25%. This suggests that the preference equityholders have for stable revenue streams dominates the potential negative e¤ects that earnings smoothing and managerial discretion may have on their ability to assess the situation of the bank. However, volatility of pro…ts is only 2 5 The general formula of the Hirschman Her…ndahl index is HHI i;t = P J j=1 X i;j;t P J j=1 X i;j;t 2 and is the sum of the squared activity shares (i is a bank indicator, t is time and j=1,...,J refers to the activities over which one measures specializa- (2012)) or by increasing the share of di¢ cultto-value Level III assets. Unfortunately, these conjectures cannot be tested in our sample as (i) the build up of subprime loans only happened in the latter sample years and (ii) reporting the amount of "Level 3 fair value measurements of loans and leases" (item bhckf245) only became compulsory in the last year of our sample (more precisely as of 2007-03-31).
a crude proxy of managerial discretion and earnings smoothing. As emphasized in Hirtle (2007), disclosure plays an important role in market discipline since market participants need to have meaningful and accurate information on which to base their judgments of risk and performance.
Managerial Discretion and Earnings Forecast Dispersion
We measure disclosure in a qualitative sense and focus on the extent to which bank managers have discretion in reporting certain accounting items, with a potential impact on the bank's perceived value and risk pro…le.
We hypothesize that the variance of the ine¢ ciency term will be larger for banks with more discretion in earnings reporting.
To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we test whether or not bank-speci…c volatility, use more discretion in loan loss provisioning and realizing trading gains, the residuals of these models will be larger. Both point to discretion in earnings management which may obscure true performance. While unexpected loan loss provisions and security gains and losses may make bank performance more di¢ cult to assess, it is often used to smooth earnings over time (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)).
Secondly, we relate the volatility of the SV ine¢ ciency term and the MTB residual to opaqueness, measured by the dispersion in analysts'earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. This measure is widely used in the accounting literature to measure …rm transparency (see e.g. Lang, Lins, and Ma¤ett (2012) The estimation results are presented in Table 5 . We not only include the managerial discretion and earnings forecast disagreement measures, but also loan growth, ROE volatility and the di¤erent complexity indicators. It is comforting that the results for those variables are very similar in the reduced sample compared to the full sample. With respect to management discretion, we …nd that stock market investors exert more pressure in their assessment of risk for banks exhibiting a high discretionary behavior in the realization of securities gains/losses. A one standard deviation increase in this discretion measure leads to a 14% increase in the dispersion of total risk ine¢ ciencies. Discretionary behavior in loan loss provisioning also matters for risk, but to a lesser extent. However, the main goal of active discretion in loan loss provisioning is earnings smoothing, which is considered favorably (i.e. stable pro…t streams lead to a lower variance of the MTB residuals and the SV ine¢ ciencies). In fact, the leeway managers permit themselves in dealing with problem loans leads to more pressure by bank equityholders in their assessment of bank value. Dispersion in IBES analyst forecasts unambiguously increases the variance of both signals. This not only suggests that banks di¤er substantially in their degrees of opaqueness, but also that stock market investors take these di¤erences into account. The dispersion in total risk ine¢ ciencies increases by 17:7% (12:4% for MTB residuals) in response to a one standard deviation increase in analyst forecasts dispersion.
2 8 We lose a signi…cant number of bank-quarter observations when matching the existing dataset with IBES data. Both datasets are merged as follows. The main identi…er in IBES is the IBES ticker, whereas the main identi…er in CRSP is the permno of the bank. Hence, in order to merge the information of both …les, the best approach is to use common secondary identi…ers to construct a linking table that relates the permno of the bank to the IBES ticker. We follow the procedure proposed by WRDS (Moussawi (2006)), which assigns a score to each match, according to the quality of the link.
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Conclusion
The To rule out that our results are driven by indirect in ‡uencing, we also investigate the contribution of other potential monitors, such as subordinated debtholders, retail and wholesale depositors and supervisors.
We …nd that regulatory enforcement actions are unlikely to explain our results, that in ‡uencing is most pronounced in banks without subordinated debt and that wholesale depositors are not reacting to our risk signals. Nevertheless, as in most other studies addressing this issue, there is a need for caution since other sources of discipline, such as unobserved actions taken by the supervisory authorities, may a¤ect bank behavior. The upper panel consists of two subplots, one for the risk signal and one for the market-to-book signal. Each subplot presents the average ine¢ ciency score or extent of misvaluation of three portfolios in event time. Each quarter, we sort BHCs into deciles according to the size of the signal. The portfolio formation quarter is denoted time period 1. We then compute the average signal size for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 quarters, holding the portfolio composition constant (except for BHCs that exit the sample). We repeat these two steps of sorting and averaging for every quarter in the sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . This process generates 60 sets of event-time averages, one for each quarter in our sample. We then compute the average signal size of each portfolio across the 60 sets within each event quarter. The most extreme decile (highest risk or lowest value) is indicated by the thicker red line. The least extreme decile as well as the two middle deciles (combined in one portfolio) are indicated in black. The dashed lines surrounding the portfolio averages represent 90 per cent con…dence bounds. They are computed as the average standard error across the 60 sets of averages (Lemmon et al., 2008) . The lower panel provides information on the fraction of banks receiving a signal in a given quarter. A bank is said to receive a signal if the ine¢ ciency score of the bank at time t is among the 10 per cent worst ine¢ ciency scores (of all banks) observed over the preceding four years. This table contains summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis of bank monitoring and consists of two parts. In panel A, we provide information on the equity market-based risk and value measures (the dependent variables). For the calculation of semi-volatility, we take the lower deviation of the daily bank stock returns within a quarter. We then semi-volatility by multiplying with the squared root of 252. We also compute a market-based valuation metric, which is the market value to the book value of tangible common equity. Both variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 on a quarterly basis. Panel B of this table contains information on the independent variables. Bank size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets expressed in US dollar thousands and de ‡ated to 2007:Q4 values. All other variables are measured as ratios. For detailed information on the exact computation of the ratios, we refer to the Appendix. Income statement data are reported on a calendar year-to-date basis in the FRY9C reports and are therefore converted to quarterto-quarter changes before computing ratios. The variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 on a quarterly basis. The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive quarters. Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume for at least twenty percent of the observations. The …nal sample consists of 17264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. All variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. This table contains results on the market in ‡uencing tests. We use a partial adjustment model to test whether or not reallocations in strategic bank characteristics occur in response to a risk (SV) and/or valuation (MTB) signal. We focus on the e¤ect on seven strategic bank characteristics: the capital ratio, asset quality (non-performing-loans ratio), cost e¢ ciency (cost-to-income ratio), pro…tability (ROE), liquidity ratio (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest income to total income and the dividend pay-out ratio. For each characteristic, we estimate the following equation:
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For sake of space and clarity, we only report the target level (left panel) and the speed of adjustment (right panel) for the seven indicators. We report the target and adjustment speed in four distinct cases where (1) the bank neither gets a a risk nor valuation signal (dummy SV= dummy MTB=0, the upper left cell), (2) the bank gets only a risk signal (dummy SV=1, dummy MTB=0, the lower left cell), (3) the bank gets only a valuation signal (dummy SV=0, dummy MTB=1, the upper right cell) and (4) the bank gets both a risk and a valuation signal (dummy SV= dummy MTB=1, the lower right cell). This results in fourteen 2 by 2 matrices. In each case, we report the p-value in parentheses to assess the statistical signi…cance of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signal, i.e. the upper left cell. Signi…cant di¤erences (w.r.t. to the benchmark case) at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level are indicated with *, ** and ***, respectively. This table provides information on whether the evidence for market in ‡uencing is di¤erent in the subsample of banks without subordinated debt holders, versus banks with subordinated debt holders. We assess whether reallocations in strategic bank characteristics occur in response to a risk (SV) and/or valuation (MTB) signal, by means of a partial adjustment model. We focus on the e¤ect on seven strategic bank characteristics: the capital ratio, asset quality (non-performing-loans ratio), management quality (cost-to-income ratio), earnings (ROE), liquidity ratio (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest income to total income and the dividend pay-out ratio.
For each characteristic, we estimate equation (3). For sake of space and clarity, we only report the target level (left panel) and the speed of adjustment (right panel) for the seven indicators. We report the target and adjustment speed in four distinct cases where (1) the bank neither gets a risk nor valuation signal (dummy SV=dummy MTB=0, the upper left cell), (2) the bank gets only a risk signal (dummy SV=1, dummy MTB=0, the lower left cell), (3) the bank gets only a valuation signal (dummy SV=0, dummy MTB=1, the upper right cell) and (4) the bank gets both a risk and a valuation signal (dummy SV=dummy MTB=1, the lower right cell). We report the results for both the subsample without subordinated debt and with subordinated debt. In each case, we report the p-value in parentheses to assess the statistical signi…cance of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signal, i.e. the upper left cell. Signi…cant di¤erences (w.r.t. to the benchmark case) at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level are indicated with *, ** and ***, respectively. In this table we provide the estimation results for the scale heterogeneity in the stochastic frontier model and the conditional heteroscedastic regression model, where the volatility of the ine¢ ciency term is related to two sets of variables. In the Full Sample, the bank-speci…c volatility of the ine¢ ciency term is related to the complexity or specialization of the banking …rm. We use Hirschmann-Her…ndahl indices of specialization or diversi…cation regarding funding, activity mix as well as revenue sources. The higher the value of the index, the more the bank is specialized in that area. We also include the past loan growth and the volatility of the ROE as independent variables. In the Reduced Sample, we introduce the dispersion in IBES analyst forecast as a measure of bank opaqueness and proxies for various aspects of (discretion in) (earnings) management, such as discretion in loan loss provisioning and the realization of securities gains and losses and earnings volatility. In the …rst column, we report for each variable the mean (…rst line) and its standard deviation (second line, in italics).
A Online Appendix -Monitoring Bank Risk and Equityholder Value
An essential …rst step in our test for market in ‡uencing is to establish a relationship between bank-speci…c risk and performance measures and various (lagged) bank-speci…c characteristics, this within either a stochastic frontier (risk) or linear regression (valuation) framework. The extensive literature on market monitoring, which shows that securityholders indeed distinguish between banks with di¤erent risk pro…les, provides good guidance on which proxies to include (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Saunders, Strock, and Travlos Our vector X i;t of bank-speci…c characteristics, which appears in Equation (1) in the paper, is hence given by: variance (as used in Section 5 of the paper). We only refer to the latter results in the few cases where they di¤er from the former.
< Insert Table A .1 around here > To facilitate the economic interpretation of the coe¢ cients, we standardize all independent variables.
Bank …xed e¤ects are included in all estimations.
Bank Strategy Variables The bank-speci…c proxies for overall bank strategy capture strategic choices made by bank managers that may a¤ect a bank's risk and valuation pro…le. We include the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio 31 and the liquid-to-total-assets ratio to incorporate the possibility that better capitalized and more liquid institutions may be less vulnerable to shocks. Asset quality is measured by the ratio of loans past due 90 days or more and non-accrual loans to total loans. We also include the cost-to-income ratio as a measure of cost e¢ ciency. This ratio measures the overheads or costs of running the bank as a percentage of total operating income before provisions. Finally, we include (the log of) bank size 32 as larger banks may diversify their risk more and may enjoy economies of scale (Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) ), and bank pro…tability (ROE) to control for a risk-return trade-o¤. The …rst part of Estimating the frontier set-up with the regulatory capital measure yields similar results. They are available upon request.
we also include variables capturing the importance of income generated by …duciary activities and tradingrelated income. All other activities that generate non-interest income are captured in the other non-interest income share. Previous studies have documented that non-interest income is in general more risky than interest income (e.g. Stiroh (2006b) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)). Our breakdown of noninterest income in four subcomponents yields additional insights. First, relative to the omitted interest income share, trading revenues and other non-interest income 34 subcomponents lead to higher semi-volatility.
Second, banks with a larger fraction of their income generated by service charges on deposit accounts experience lower stock market semi-volatility. However, this coe¢ cient is no longer signi…cant in column 3.
Finally, we include three indicators to measure the potential diversi…cation e¤ects of liquidity risk on the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2009) …nd scope for deposit-loan synergies. 35 Banks exposed to loan-liquidity risk without high levels of transaction deposits have higher risk. Bank risk is expected to rise with unused commitments (re ‡ecting asset-side liquidity risk exposure) and the use of transaction deposits (re ‡ecting liability-side liquidity risk exposure). The synergy e¤ect is measured by the interaction term between the ratio of unused loan commitments and transaction deposits. Two of the three e¤ects are con…rmed in our sample. The transaction deposits increase bank risk, but the combination with unused loan commitments provides a statistically and economically signi…cant hedge against liquidity risk and reduces the risk of the bank.
Overall, we can conclude that stock market investors accurately identify the di¤erent risks associated with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics and use this in their assessment of the banks' valuation and risk pro…le. Although this evidence does not yet establish that market discipline can e¤ectively control banking …rms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally di¤erentiate among the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking …rms. This is evidence of the …rst step in market discipline, market monitoring, which is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition to support the market in ‡uencing hypothesis.
Robustness and remarks As a robustness check, we also include state …xed e¤ects for at least two reasons. First, unobserved heterogeneity at the state level, such as state-speci…c regulation or the composition 3 4 Other non-interest income are predominantly fees and commissions from investment banking and underwriting, (re)insurance underwriting and venture capital revenue. 3 5 Quijano (2013)'s results provide an additional motiviation to control for deposit-loan synergies.
38 of the local economy may a¤ect banks' riskiness as well as their business mix. Second, Mester (1997) has documented that controlling for heterogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis is important to obtain accurate estimates of ine¢ ciency. Rather than estimating the frontier at the state or region level, which would yield imprecise estimates as the number of observations is small for many states, we allow the intercept of the stochastic frontier to be di¤erent across states. Signi…cance and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are quite similar in both speci…ciations. In the few di¤erences, we never obtain con ‡icting results in terms of sign.
It is worth stressing that the (rank)correlation between the ine¢ ciency scores with and without state …xed e¤ects is almost perfect. In sum, including state …xed e¤ects does not alter the results.
In the multiplicative heteroscedastic regression setup (the setup for MTB), we cluster the standard errors at the bank level (which yields the most conservative standard errors). Unfortunately, clustering techniques have not yet been implemented in the standard stochastic frontier models. Moreover, it is even more complicated in our extended approach in which we also model the variance of the ine¢ ciency score.
Fortunately, as clustering does not a¤ect the coe¢ cients or ine¢ ciency score/residual, but only the standard errors of the coe¢ cients; our setup to test for the presence and strength of in ‡uencing (which is our main contribution) is una¤ected by the choice of clustering.
Finally, the signals obtained from estimating a model with and without scale heterogeneity (i.e. modelling the variance as a function of bank characteristics) are very similar. The correlation between the ine¢ ciency scores in column 1 and 3 is 95%, whereas the correlation between the residuals of equation 2 and 4 is even higher 98%. Recall that we de…ned signals as belonging to the highest decile. 84% of the SV signals based on column 3 would also be classi…ed as signals in column 1. An additional 14% of signals based on column 3, belongs to the 9th decile (rather than the 10th decile) if signals were based on column 1. The correspondence is even higher with respect to market-to-book-signals. 90% of the MTB signals based on column 4 belong to the extreme decile based on column2. An additional 9:6% belongs to the 9th decile of residuals based on column 2. (1) in the paper. Columns 1 and 2 contain the results of the stochastic frontier model (semi-volatility) and the conditional heteroscedastic regression model (market-to-book value of equity). Column 3 contains the results of the stochastic frontier model (semi-volatility) where the variance of the ine¢ ciency term is a function of bank-speci…c characteristics (hence, we allow for scale heterogeneity). Column 4 contains the results of the conditional heteroscedastic regression model, in which the volatility of the error terms is a function of bank characteristics. We estimate a 'cost' function for total risk. That is, the ine¢ ciency score measures excess risk above the frontier, which is determined by the banks with minimum risk given a set of bank characteristics. In particular, stochastic frontier analysis allows decomposing the error term in random noise and a measure of risk ine¢ ciency. As …rms (banks) can be both over-or undervalued with respect to their fundamentals, we employ a standard OLS regression model (with both positive and negative residuals) rather than a stochastic frontier model which only allows for one-sided deviations from the frontier. The variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 at a quarterly basis. Bank balance sheets are observed and measured as stock values at a quarterly basis. Data from the income statement is reported on a cumulative basis over the accounting year and are therefore …rst transformed to quarterly increments. The independent variables are lagged one quarter. The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive quarters. Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume for more than 20 percent of the observations. The total sample consists of 17.264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. Time and bank …xed e¤ects are included in each column (but not reported). In the second column, the standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level.
